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Abstract
The main aim of this work is to explain the Chilean gender wage gap using a dynamic monopsony
model to estimate labor supply elasticities at the rm level. To the best of our knowledge, our study
is the rst to measure monopsony power at the rm level using voluntary separations and the rst to
apply this methodology to estimate such elasticities for a middle-income country. Our results suggest that
elasticities of labor supply to rms are rather small, which implies that rms have market power. We also
found that Chilean men earn approximately 19% more than women as a result of the di¤erence in labor
supply elasticities by gender, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, we found that the magnitude of between-rm
di¤erences in elasticities are more than twice the magnitude of within-rm di¤erences, suggesting that
the gender wage gap is driven more by structural factors that generate gender sorting to rms. Finally,
we found that elasticities for a high-income country (United States) are 63% and 100% higher than those
obtained for a middle-income country for men and women, respectively, suggesting higher labor market
frictions in middle-income countries for men and even higher for women.
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1 Introduction
Chile is a small open economy that has experienced sustained and rapid economic growth, with an increasing
trend in household incomes and falling poverty rates for most of the last four decades (Contreras, 2003;
Armendáriz and Larraín, 2017). Nevertheless, Chile is one of the most unequal countries in the world
(Weber, 2017). In particular, according to the 2018 report of the United Nations Development Program,
although important advances in human development continue to be made in Chile, the problem of gender
inequality still prevails in the country. Indeed, while Chile occupies the 44th position worldwide on the
Human Development Index, it still falters in terms of gender equality, occupying the 72nd position on this
dimension.
Furthermore, Chile has one of the lowest rates of female labor participation in the LATAM region (Con-
treras et al 2011) and a large gender wage gap (Acosta et al. 2007). Regarding this latter issue, the OECD
Education at a Glance 2018 report revealed that in 2015, Chilean women who completed university received
65 percent of the salary earned by men with the same level of education, which falls considerably lower
than the average of 74 percent across the OECD countries (OECD, 2018). This nding highlights Chile as
the country with the highest gender pay gap, one of the lowest levels of GDP per capita and one of the
worst-performing educational systems in the OECD. Because of this and as suggested by previous literature
reports (e.g., Montero and Rau 2015), Chile is an interesting case to study: it is a developing economy that
shares similarities with developed countries in terms of labor market institutions (e.g., unemployment insur-
ance, minimum wage and active labor market programs) but has not completed the transition to economic
development (e.g., a signicant share of its labor market is informal work, high wage inequality, and low
quality of education, among others).
We focus on the gender wage gap, as it is quite relevant to increasing female labor force participation,
which is in turn an important driver (and outcome) of economic growth and development (Mammen and
Paxson, 2000; Gaddis and Klasen, 2014). The gender pay gap has been studied for decades in economics
(see, for example, Altonji and Blank 1999, Bertrand 2011 and Blau and Kahn 2017 for surveys), mainlybut
not exclusivelybecause womens diminished economic power has detrimental e¤ects on society as a whole,
a¤ecting pensions, health, poverty and scal policy, among others (e.g., European Commission 2013). As
pointed out by the ECLAC (2016), while Chile has shown some progress in recent years in closing the gender
wage gap, it has narrowed more slowly for well-educated women than for others, and the slow pace of change
hampers the development and progress towards gender equality.
While there is a vast body of literature that studies the wage gaps between men and women in Chile,
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all studies considered perfectly competitive labor markets (Bravo, Sanhueza and Urzúa, 2008a y 2008c; Gill,
1992; Gill and Montenegro, 2002; Montenegro, 2001; Paredes, 1982; Paredes and Riveros, 1994; Perticara
and Bueno, 2009), assuming a perfectly elastic labor supply (Becker, 1971). This competitive approach
assumes that two workers with the same characteristics doing the same job at the same rm must be paid
the same wage. If they are not, the residual di¤erence must be due to discrimination. Becker pointed out that
competitive forces should reduce or eliminate discrimination in the long run because the least discriminatory
rms would have lower costs of production and should drive more discriminatory rms out of the market.
Studies related to monopsony models in the labor market have questioned Beckers approach because of
the existence of frictions in the labor market (Robinson, 1933; Madden, 1973; and Black, 1995). It is important
to clarify that modern labor economics, which uses monopsony models, does not assume monopsony power
in the classical sense of a single employer, a la Robinson (Robinson, 1933). The new monopsony literature
(Manning 2003) emphasizes that monopsony power may arise even if there are many rms competing for
workers. These models yield upward-sloping rm-level labor supply curves (even without concentration on the
demand side) due to search frictions, heterogeneous preferences among workers and mobility costs. Therefore,
as noted by Webber (2016), in the new monopsony literature, the word monopsony is a synonymous with
monopsonistic competition, imperfect competition, nite labor supply elasticity, an upward-sloping labor
supply curve to the rm and basically any departure from perfect competition.
This literature suggests that the monopsonistic framework could explain how discriminatory gender wage
di¤erences arise and persist if rms wield greater monopsony power over female workers than male workers.
For this to hold, womens supply of labor to the rm must be less wage elastic than mens. Womens lower
labor supply elasticity may be due to a variety of factors, such as the following:
1. Family locational decisions (Cooke et al. 2009, Benson 2014 and Webber 2016): in general, the male is
the primarily breadwinner. Therefore, a family may make locational decisions based primarily on the
husbands job prospects. This situation forces the wife to search for a job only in a local labor market
centered around her husbands place of employment.
2. Workers preferences (Bonin et al. 2007, Albanesi and Olivetti 2009, Brown et al. 2011): It has been
found that women may place greater importance on nonwage benets o¤ered by employers (e.g., exible
work schedules or other family-friendly practices that limit the number of jobs that are suitable) than
do men.
3. Lower bargaining power (Croson and Gneezy 2009, Card et al. 2016, Cruz and Rau 2017): Previous
studies have found that mens and womens average propensity to negotiate di¤ers, with women being
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much less likely to do so. Womens lower propensity to negotiate could reect social factors, including
women being socialized to feel that they are being pushy or overbearing (unfeminine) if they negotiate.
4. Psychological attributes (Mueller and Plug 2006 , Borghans et al. 2014, Brown and Taylor 2014): The
previous literature has found that men place a higher value on money, have higher self-esteem, are
less risk averse, are more competitive, are more self-condent and disagreeable, and believe that they
control their own fate to a greater extent than do women. As suggested by Blau and Kahn (2017), in
equilibrium, we expect such traits to be related to wages, and if men and women di¤er in psychological
attributes, then those di¤erences will contribute to explaining the gender pay gap.
5. Sorting (Card et al. 2016, Cruz and Rau 2017): some studies have suggested that women are less
likely to be hired at high-paying rms than men. In this case, we should observe a wage gap due to
employment sorting.
Because of these factors, women may have fewer outside options than men, making their labor supply to
the rm more inelastic. Furthermore, as suggested by previous literature, the factors presented above may
have heterogeneous e¤ects. For example, as Cattan (2014) pointed out, some psychological attributes such
as self-condence may be rewarded di¤erently among executives than among clerical workers and between
men and woman. In this way, it is important to include the possibility of heterogeneous e¤ects in the model,
something that it is not common in this literature.
The implications of monopsony models were originally studied by Manning (2003), who formalized a
method for identifying the labor supply elasticity facing the rm from job-to-job transitions. Models using
this approach are known as dynamic monopsony models because they emphasize the dynamic nature of the
monopsonistic market.
Due to data constraints, only recently have studies started considering the impact that imperfect compe-
tition in the labor market may have on the gender wage gap. Most of these studies have focused at the market
level, nding that male elasticity is higher than female elasticity and that this di¤erence can explain around
one-third of the gender wage gap. Until now, the only existing evidence at the rm level has come from the
United States, although that study did not use voluntary separations. The use of voluntary separations (i.e.,
quits) is crucial because labor markets may appear to be less monopsonistic when the reason for separation
is not identied, suggesting an upward bias of the elasticity measures in the previous literature (see Sánchez
et al, 2019) 1 . Furthermore, it can be argued that market imperfections (i.e., search frictions, mobility costs,
1 In a related paper, we found that labor supply elasticities increased by roughly 18% when all separations (i.e., without
identifying their source) were used instead of voluntary separations (i.e., quits).
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etc) are more prevalent in middle- and low-income countries than than in the United States due to higher
poverty rates, greater di¢culty in starting businesses, poorer information technologies and transportation
infrastructure, fewer education opportunities, and lower unionization rates (e.g., Jackson and Jabbie 2019).
Additionally, empirical studies have noted that larger, more informal sectors and more widespread discrim-
ination in many middle- and low-income countries are particularly harmful to female equality and mobility
(Chioda 2011;World Bank 2012).
Hence, our work aims at calculating and comparing labor supply elasticities at the rm level by gender
using voluntary separations (i.e., quits) for a middle-income country with those obtained for a high-income
country, examining indirectly the prevalence of labor market frictions in both cases. Furthermore, our main
idea is to estimate how much of the gender wage gap can be explained by the exercise of market power by
Chilean rms.
We used the Chilean Unemployment Administrative Database. This is a panel database that considers
information about individuals who were employed in the private sector (as dependent workers) since October
2002 and decided to a¢liate with this system, as well as those individuals who were not working at that
time but who found a dependent job in the private sector after that date. By February 2016, the number
of a¢liated individuals reached 8.8 million (i.e., the vast majority of the dependent workers in Chile, as
suggested by the Superintendecia de Pensiones and Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas). The mentioned data
set includes all the required variables, allowing us to study the dynamics of the labor market by rm because
we can identify the employee and employer in each time period, as well as wages, separations and the cause
of each separation, among others.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review focused on previous works
analyzing the Chilean gender wage gap and on dynamic monopsony models. Section 3 puts forward a
theoretical model that highlights the importance of the labor supply elasticity in the gender wage gap.
Section 4 presents our empirical strategy. Section 5 describes the data and provides summary statistics of
the key variables necessary to estimate our models. Section 6 presents the main results of our work, and
Section 7 includes concluding remarks and a discussion of avenues for future research.
2 Literature Review
The literature on the Chilean gender wage gap started with Paredes (1982) and Paredes and Riveros (1994),
who estimated for the rst time the average gender wage gap for Chile, nding values ranging between 20%
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and 30%, depending on the controls and specications used. Montenegro (2001) and Gill and Montenegro
(2002) used the standard Mincerian wage equation and estimated it separately by gender using the quantile
regression method and also broke down the total wage gap into an explained term (due to di¤erences in
endowments) and a residual (or unexplained term) using the Oaxaca decomposition. The results showed that
there are systematic di¤erences in the returns to education and experience by gender along the conditional
wage distribution and that the unexplained wage di¤erential is higher in the upper quantiles of the conditional
wage distribution. Perticará and Astudillo (2008) also used quantile regressions to evaluate the gender wage
gap, taking into account the potential endogeneity of the education variable and controlling for e¤ective work
experience. The characteristic e¤ect is found to be small and statistically insignicant up to approximately
the 50th quantile (median), where it becomes positive (favorable to women) and grows monotonically up to
12% in the 90th percentile. They did not nd a glass-ceiling e¤ect in the Chilean labor market once they
controlled for the endogeneity potential of the education variable.2
Ñopo (2007) used a decomposition approach that stresses the need for comparisons inside the common
support for the distributions of observable characteristics of individuals. The results suggested that there
are noticeable gender wage gaps in Chile favoring males, which are measured at around 25 percent of average
female wages, and that these gaps are higher at the highest percentiles of the wage distribution among those
with higher educational attainment. Contrary to Perticará and Astudillo (2008), this work showed some
evidence of a glass-ceiling e¤ect in Chilean labor markets such that for some occupations and particular
combinations of observable characteristics, there are highly paid males but not females.
Bravo, Sanhueza and Urzúa (2008) presented an analysis of the gender di¤erences in the Chilean labor
market, which formally dealt with the selection of the individuals into schooling levels and its consequences
on gender gaps. Their results showed that there exist statistically signicant gender di¤erences that critically
depend on the schooling level of the individuals considered in the analysis. Finally, Perticara and Bueno
(2009) studied the existing wage gaps by gender controlling for e¤ective work experience and its time duration.
They argued that even when there are still wage di¤erences between men and women, the introduction of
controls for e¤ective work experience and the instrument for the selection of work experience in Chile are
key factors.
In this work, we want to extend the previous literature by measuring the Chilean gender wage gap using a
dynamic monopsony model, estimating labor supply elasticities at the rm level. Manning (2003) estimated
labor supply elasticities for two American and two British data sets: the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
2A "ceiling" or "glass ceiling" e¤ect is said to exist when the unexplained component of the wage gap is proportionally larger
in the upper deciles of income.
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and National Longitudinal Study of Youth from the United States and the Labour Force Survey and British
Household Panel Study from the United Kingdom. Labor supply elasticities are quite low for all four data
sets (ranging from 0.7 to 1.4), but he does not nd di¤erences by gender. Because Manning used data
sets based on supply-side individual- or household-level surveys, he was not able to control adequately for
rm-specic determinants of transition behavior.
Due to data constraints, only recently have studies considered the impact that imperfect competition
in the labor market may have on the gender wage gap. A special issue of the Journal of Labor Economics
(2010) presented several studies on dynamic monopsony in labor markets. However, there have been only
two studies that have analyzed the gender wage gap with monopsonistic labor markets. They are Ransom
and Oaxaca (2010) and Hirsh et al. (2010); the former used data from one regional grocery retailer in the
United States, and the latter used German panel data.
Ransom and Oaxaca (2010) made use of one of the implications of monopsony models, which is the fact
that under certain conditions, the labor supply curve might be calculated by the wage separation elasticity
(these authors recognized that it was more appropriate to use the wagequit elasticity, but they did not have
that information.) Ransom and Oaxaca exploited the di¤erences in wages and separations between job titles
in a rm. Furthermore, they did not control for rm-specic controls (as in Manning 2003) and implicitly
treated wages of workers as exogenous; they claimed that employers had no control over wages because
wages for each job title are xed by bargaining. The authors found di¤erences between the labor supply
elasticity of males and females, with the latter being smaller than the former (i.e., 2.5 for men and 1.6 for
women). Ransom and Oaxaca (2010) relied on a specication in the spirit of Burdett and Mortensens (1998)
equilibrium search model with wage posting, where, among others, transitions to and from nonemployment
are wage inelastic; therefore, one rms wage-related hire is another rms wage-related quit.
Unlike the study by Ransom and Oaxaca (2010), Hirsch et al. (2010) allowed for wage-elastic transitions
to and from nonemployment and controlled for rm characteristics. They made use of the German-linked
employer-employee data set LIAB for the years 20002002. Their estimated elasticities ranged from 1.9 to
3.7, depending on specication, with womens elasticity always lower than mens. Their results suggested
that new monopsony models imply that rms have substantial monopsony power given that the estimated
elasticities are rather small in size. Furthermore, although they did not directly test the di¤erence between
mens and womens elasticities, they calculated that it should explain roughly one-third of the observed
gender pay gap, a result similar to that found by Ransom and Oaxaca (2010). It is important to note that
this result cannot be directly tested in the data used in these studies but rather is theoretically implied by
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the di¤erence in gender-specic elasticities at the market level.
So far, all the empirical studies have calculated the elasticity at the market level. Webber (2015) extended
the theoretical and empirical model to the rm level using thousands of rms in several industries for the
United States rather than one rm, as used by Ransom and Oaxaca (2010). He found support in the data
for dynamic monopsony models. Webber (2016) extended his previous work by breaking down elasticity by
gender. He estimated for the United States the male and female labor supply elasticity by rm and used
this information to study the gender pay gap. In both of his studies, Webber used separations (due to data
constraints, he could not identify quits versus layo¤s) and found substantial search frictions in the United
States labor market, with females facing a higher level of frictions than males. He also found that males
faced a labor supply elasticity 0.15 points higher than that for females (i.e., 1.09 versus 0.94), which leads
to 3.3 percent lower earnings for women.
Unfortunately, the current literature does not di¤erentiate voluntary from involuntary separations (i.e.,
quits from layo¤s). As Vick (2017) suggested, this denition is crucial because worker movements toward
better o¤ers drive the dynamics of the monopsony model. He pointed out that including layo¤s in the
data (as in Ransom and Oaxaca (2010), Hirsh et al. (2010), and Webber (2015) and (2016)) may confuse
estimates based on worker movements. Therefore, knowing the reason for job separations is critical, as
elasticity estimates based on hazard models of quits vs. layo¤s yield very di¤erent wage coe¢cients. In
particular, Vick found that elasticities using separations move in a di¤erent direction from quit elasticities.
This fact suggests that failing to distinguish between the two potentially biases elasticity estimates and may
fail to capture gender di¤erences in worker separation decisions. In this way, Vick found a labor elasticity
of supply at the market level of 1.6-2.2 for men and 1.2-1.5 for women when quits were taken into account.
Finally, Sánchez et al. (2019) extended Webbers analysis by including the reason for separation. These
authors found that estimations of labor supply elasticities increased by roughly 18% when all separations
(i.e., without identifying their source) were used instead of voluntary separations (i.e., quits). Therefore, in
this study, we will not return to the discussion of separations versus quits; we will directly use quits.
3 Theoretical Model
The starting point of our analysis is a Cobb-Douglas production function, featuring constant returns to scale
and heterogeneous labor inputs:
7
Qjt = AjtK

jtL
1 
jt (1)
For simplicity, we assume the rms capital stock (i.e. non-labor inputs summarized by K) is xed so
that we can e¤ectively ignore the role of capital (i.e. non labor inputs) in the model and write the production
function as Q(L [Em; Ef ]). Where L is a composite of male and female employment (Em; Ef ). Therefore,
to see how a rms labor supply elasticity a¤ects the wage it pays, consider a prot maximizing rm that
faces the following objective function:
Max wM ;wF = pQ(Em; Ef )  wmEm(wm)  wfEf (wf ) (2)
where p is the price of the output produced according to the production function Q, wm and wf are
wages for male and female workers respectively which determine the male and female labor supplied to the
rm (Em and Ef ) respectively. Taking the rst order conditions:
@
@wm
= p
@Q(Em; Ef )
@Em

@Em
@wm
  Em(wm)
@Em
@wm
= 0 (3)
@
@wf
= p
@Q(Em; Ef )
@Ef

@Ef
@wf
  Ef (wf )
@Ef
@wf
= 0 (4)
and dening "m = wmEm
@Em
@wm
and "f =
wf
Ef
@Ef
@wf
as labor supply elasticities of male and female workers
respectively, these equations can be writen as:
p
@Q(Em; Ef )
@Em
= wm

1 +
1
"m

p
@Q(Em; Ef )
@Ef
= wf

1 +
1
"f

reorganizing terms we obtain:
wm =
p
@Q(Em;Ef )
@Em
1 + 1
"m
 (5)
wf =
p
@Q(Em;Ef )
@Ef
1 + 1
"f
 (6)
8
From equations(5) and (6), we can derive the standard result of perfect competition (" = 1), in which
wages will be equal to the marginal product of labor.
Finally, it is possible to see that for two workers with the same marginal product of labor (i.e. @Q(Em;Ef )
@Ef
=
@Q(Em;Ef )
@Em
), we can obtain the gender wage gap (ratio of female to male wages) as follows:
wf
wm
=

1 + 1
"m


1 + 1
"f
 (7)
From equation (7), it transpires that a gender wage gap will be generated by di¤erences in female and
male rm labor supply elasticities.
4 Empirical Strategy
4.1 Estimating the Elasticity of Labor Supply
In order to estimate the labor supply elasticity to the rm we followed Manning (2003) and used a simple
model of an economy with search frictions. This model is in turn based on Burdett and Mortensens (1998)
seminal paper. These authors developed a model of an economy with on the job search in which employers
post wages based on their competitors behavior, In this model, workers will switch jobs if they receive a
higher wage elsewhere. For simplicity, we do not consider non pecuniary benets in the model.
Assume that there are Mt equally productive workers, where productivity is given by p and each worker
gains utility b from leisure. Furthermore, assume that there are Me constant returns to scale rms, which
are innitesimally small when compared to the entire economy. A rm set wages w to maximize steady
state prots  = (p w)N(w) where N(w) is the labor supply to the rm. Lets also dene F (w) as the cdf
of wage o¤ers observed in the economy and f(w) the corresponding pdf. All workers within a rm must be
paid the same wage. In this model, employed workers will accept a wage o¤er w if it is greater than their
current wage w and nonemployed workers will accept wif w> b:
Wage o¤ers are drawn randomly from the distribution F (w); and arrive to all workers at rate : Assume
also an exogeneous job destruction rate () and that all workers leave the job market at rate () to be
replaced in nonemployment by an equivalent number of workers. Denote R(w) and s(w) as the recruitment
ow and separation rate functions of a rm that pays a wage w respectively:
R(w) = RN + 
WZ
0
f(x)N(x)dx (8)
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s(w) =  + (1  F (w)) (9)
where RN are the recruits from nonemployment. Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and Manning (2003)
showed that, wage dispersion is an equilibrium outcome in this model, even when workers are equally
productive, as long as one assumes that the arrival rate of job o¤ers is positive but nite. In perfect
competition the arrival rate tends to innity and the wage will be the marginal product of labor. On the
other hand, if  tends to zero, the wage will be the reservation wage b:
As Manning (2003) showed, it is possible to formulate the supply of labor to a rm with the following
equation:
Nt(w) = Nt 1(w) [1  st 1(w)] +Rt 1(w) (10)
which can be read as follows: the labor supply today is equal to the fraction of workers from last period
who stay with the rm plus the new recruits. Assuming a steady state we can rewrite equation (10) as:
N(w) =
R(w)
s(w)
(11)
taking the natural log of each side, multiplying by w and di¤erentiating we can write the labor supply
elasticity at time t as a function of the long run elasticities of recuitment and separations3 :
"N = "R   "S
It is possible to further decompose these elasticities. Following Manning (2003), we can split recruitment
ow from unemployment versus recruitment ow from other rms and separation rate to unemployment
versus separation rate to other employment:
"N = 
R"ER + (1  
R)"NR   
S"ES   (1  
S)"NS (12)
where "ER is the elasticity of recruitment of workers from employment, "
N
R is the elasticity of recruitment
of workers from nonemployment, "ES is the elasticity of separation of workers to employment, "
N
S is the
3 It actually should be quits but due to data constraints almost all empirical evidence uses separations. This di¤erence is
crucial as Vick (2017) showed that results di¤er signicantly when using one versus the other. To be consistent literature, we
keep separations in our notation of the description of the model. However, we will use both of them in our empirical section to
show the misleading results obtained when separations are used instead of quits.
10
elasticity of separation of workers to nonemployment. R and S are the share of recruits from employment
and the share of separations to employment respectively.
As discussed in the literature, the two separations elasticities can be estimated easily with duration
models (described below). However, recruitment elasticities are harder to obtain (see details in Manning
2003, chapter 4). Therefore, it is handy to express recruitment elasticities as functions of estimable quantities
such as (see derivation in Manning (2003) chapter 4):
"ER =
 S"ES
R
(13)
"NR = "
E
R  
wR(w)
R(w)
h
1  R(w)
i (14)
This is derived from the denition of the share of total recruits which come from employment:
R = R
E
RE+RN

, where RE and RN are the recruits from employment and nonemployment respectively.
Taking the natural log of each side and di¤erentiating yields equations (13) and (14). As presented in
Webber (2016), the second term of the right hand side of equation (14) can be thought of as the bargaining
premium that an employee receives from searching while currently employed.
To conclude, the labor supply elasticity to the rm can be written as a function of both separation
elasticities, the premium to searching while employed and the calculated shares of separations and recruits
to/from employment.
4.1.1 Estimation of the Elasticity of labor supply to the rm
In order to estimate the labor supply elasticity to the rm by gender, we follow Webber (2016). This
author used an augmented gender by rm level implementation of the methodology proposed in Manning
(2003). To estimate the labor supply elasticity to the rm we need several elements. First, the elasticities
of separation to employment ("ES ) and nonemployment ("
N
S ) respectively Second, the premium to searching
while employed

wR(w)
R(w)[1 R(w)]

. Third, the recruitment and separation share for each rm (S and R).
Each of the following models is run separately by gender for every rm in the sample, where the unit of
observation is an employment spell.
We start with the estimation of the elasticity of separation to nonemployment ("NS ). To do this we use a
Cox proportional hazard model given by:
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(t j N; sep log(earnings)i +Xi
N; sep) = 0(t)e
(N; sep log(earnings)i+Xi
N; sep) (15)
where () is the hazard function; 0 is the baseline hazard; t is the length of empoyment; log(earnings) is
the natural log of individual is earnings and X is a vector of explanatory variables. Workers who transition
to a new employer or who are with the same employer at the end of the data series are considered to have a
censored employment spell.  represents the estimate of the elasticity of separation to nonemployment.
The estimation of the elasticity of separation to employment ("ES ) follows an analogous setting:
(t j E; sep log(earnings)i +Xi
E; sep) = 0(t)e
(E; sep log(earnings)i+Xi
E; sep) (16)
with the only di¤erence being that the sample is restricted to those workers who do not have a job
transition to nonemployment.
To estimate the premium to searching while employed

wR(w)
R(w)[1 R(w)]

we follow Manning (2003) who
shows that this is equivalent to the coe¢cient on log earnings when estimating the following logistic regression:
Prec =
e(
E; rec log(earnings)i+Xi
E; rec)
1 + e(
E; rec log(earnings)i+XiE; rec)
(17)
where the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if a worker was recruited from employment and 0 if they
where recruited from nonemployment. This coe¢cient is also interacted with time dummies on order to
allow for time variation.
5 Data and Summary Statistics
To estimate the labor supply elasticity of the rm by gender, we use Chiles full administrative Unemployment
Insurance ("Seguro de Cesantía", in Spanish) database provided by the Unemployment Fund Administrator.
By law, the Unemployment Fund Administrator is required to collect, on a monthly basis, all contributions to
unemployment individual accounts for each labor relation. To obtain our nal dataset, we removed all spells
that spanned fewer than 3 months, because the data do not contain information as to when during the month
an individual was hired/separated. Therefore, the entries for the rst and last month of any employment
spell will almost certainly underestimate an individuals monthly earnings (unless the individual was hired
on the rst day or left employment on the last day of a month). While this procedure certainly eliminates
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short (and likely low-wage) jobs, it also prevents us from systematically underestimating monthly wages.4
We furthermore removed job spells that fell in the top and bottom 1 % of earnings observations. We also
limited our analysis to rms with at least 100 total employment spells of any length over the lifespan of the
rm, and 25 separations or hirings. Finally, we also excluded rms in the agricultural sector.
Our dataset spans from January 2010 to December 2017 and includes individual and employer charac-
teristics such as age, age squared, education, gender, tenure, tenure squared, region, time of a­iation to
the insurance, monthly taxable income, the reason and date of separation, industry, date of hiring, type of
contract and geographical location, among others.
The variable education has several missing observations in the Unemployment Insurance dataset which
is why we complemented it with administrative information from the Ministry of Education. In this way,
we can recover the missing information of the education variable. In Table 1 we present the descriptive
statistics of our database, we observe that male workers are slightly older and less educated than female
workers. Furthermore, male workers receive 34.4% higher wages than female workers and also have shorter
employment spells than female workers (17.7 months versus 20.4 months on average).
After making these restrictions, we are left with a sample of all workers for whom we can estimate a
gender-specic labor-supply elasticity. This sample is made up of 6,866,636 employment spells, belonging to
3,212,361 unique individuals, who work at 7,357 separate rms.
6 Results
6.1 Labor Supply Elasticity by Firm and Gender
Table 2 list the average (weighted by employment) rm level elasticities using voluntary separations broken
down by gender. It can be seen that labor supply elasticities are 0.49 for men and 0.38 for women. Using
the main result of our theretical model, given by equation (7), we can work out the empirical value of the
gender wage gap, which in this case implies that men should earn approximately 19% more than women as a
result of the di¤erence in labor supply elasticities ceteris paribus. It transpires that labor supply elasticities
are rather small, which suggests that rms still do retain relevant market power.These results cannot be
directly compared with the existing literature, since we are the rst to estimate labor supply elasticities at
the rm level using voluntary separations. However, we conduct an indirect comparison below.
4Results do not change in a signicant way with this assumption.
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6.2 Comparing Labor Supply Elasticities: Developed versus Developing Coun-
tries
Webber (2016) reported labor supply elasticities at the rm level for the United States using separations
but without identifying the reason of termination. As suggested by Sánchez et al. (2019) not identifying the
reason for termination increases labor supply elasticities by roughly 18%. Therefore, if we conduct a simple
exercise and decrease Webbers elasticities by 18% we should be able to say something about the degree of
competition of a developed versus a developing labor market. We present both results in Table 3 and results
suggest that even after adjusting U.S. elasticities, they are still higher than those estimated for Chile. This
fact suggests that the United States has a more competitive labor market. In particular, for men United
States elasticities are 63% higher than the Chilean equivalent while for women the di¤erence is more than
100%. This comparison is interesting because the chilean labor market has important di¤erences compared
with the United States labor market. For example, the Chilean labor market has a higher level of informality
(30%) than the United States labor market (20%)5 , lower levels of average education (10.3 years versus 13.4
years)6 , greater di¢culty associated with starting a business (56th versus 8th in Doing Business Ranking
2019), less investment in transport infrastructure (34% of Chilean GDP and 42% of United States GDP)7
and an overall higher rigidity of the labor market (e.g. higher severance payments, higher unionization rate,
among others)8 which highlights important di¤erences between developed versus developing labor markets.
6.3 Distribution of Labor Supply Elasticity by Firm and Gender
Now we turn to analyze the di¤erences between and within rm percentile elasticity distribution. The results
are presented in Table 2 for voluntary separations. Columns 2, 3 and 4 list results for the 25th, 50th and
75th percentiles of the distribution of estimated rm level labor supply elasticities. It can be noted that
the result presented in column 1 is larger than those presented in columns 2 and 3 which implies that the
mean is higher than the median. This nding is consistent with the right skewed distribution of estimated
elasticities.
A second interesting result is that di¤erences across rms percentiles in the elasticity gap are larger
than di¤erences within rm percentiles. For example, a larger within elasticity gap di¤erence appears in
5Chile: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas. U.S.A.: Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis: https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-
the-economy/2017/april/informal-labor-market
6Source: Human Development Reports. http://hdr.undp.org/en/indicators/103006
7OECD: https://data.oecd.org/transport/infrastructure-investment.htm
8 In the OECD index (2013), where 0 is soft and 5 is strict, Chile has a score of 2.5 for individual dismissal while the U.S.
has 0.5. Source: https://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm
https://www1.compareyourcountry.org/employment-protection-legislation/en/0/176/datatable//CHL+USA
Unionization rate in Chile 2018 (20%) and in the U.S. (10.5%). Source: for Chile, Consejo Superior Laboral. For the U.S.,
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf
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the 75th percentile; 0.92 and 1.09 for men and women respectively (a di¤erence of 0.17). This di¤erence
is much smaller than the 0.92 and the 1.09 obtained between the 75th-25th percentile for men and women
respectively.
6.4 Between and Within Firm Di¤erences
We conducted complementary analysis to further investigate between versus within rm di¤erences in gender-
specic elasticities. We used a sample of rms that only included individuals who worked at rms where
we were able to estimate both, a male and a female labor-supply elasticity. This sample contains 3,387,908
employment spells, belonging to 1,742,547 unique individuals, who work at 2,374 separate rms.
In the upper panel of Table 4 we calculate the di¤erence among these gender-specic elasticities sug-
gesting, in our prefered model (full model time varying), that, on average, male elasticities between rms are
0.07 higher than female elasticities. In the second panel of Table 4 we present within rm di¤erences which
are calculated by taking the di¤erence between male and female elasticities for each rm and then taking
the average of the di¤erences across rms. The results of our preferred model (full model time varying)
suggest that, on average, male elasticities are 0.03 higher than female elasticities within rms. This nding
suggests that between rm di¤erences are more than twice the magnitude of within rm di¤erences (in our
prefered model). In other words, between rm di¤erences in elasticities are more important than within rm
di¤erences in elasticities.
6.5 Characterizing the Firm
As noted above, there are signicant di¤erences in the magnitudes of labor supply elasticities along its
distribution. Furthermore, the elasticity gap reverses at the top part of the elasticity distribution. Therefore,
in order to gain insights into the characteristics of rms appearing at the lowest and highest parts of the
elasticity distribution, we present in Table 5 a characterization of rms in the lower 25th and the upper
75th percentile of the labor supply elasticity distribution. For men and women, rms with low labor supply
elasticities (those under the 25th percentile) pay lower wages than rms with high elasticity (those higher
the 75th percentile). Furthermore, rms with low labor supply elasticity have slightly older workers than
rms with high elasticity. Finally, workers in rms with low labor supply elasticity have shorter job spells
and lower education levels than those working in rms with high labor supply elasticity.
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7 Concluding Remarks
We analyzed the gender wage gap using a dynamic monopsony model and estimated labor supply elasticities
at the rm level for Chile. We additionally contributed to the literature by estimating for the rst time labor
supply elasticities using voluntary separations (i.e., quits). We nd that Chilean men earn approximately
19% more than women as a result of the di¤erence in labor supply elasticities, ceteris paribus. Our results
also suggest that labor supply elasticities are rather small, which implies that rms have relevant market
power. Furthermore, we nd that rms with low labor supply elasticities have less educated workers, pay
lower wages and have shorter employment spells than rms with high labor supply elasticities.
We also investigated between- versus within-rm di¤erences in gender-specic elasticities. Our results
suggest that, on average, male elasticities are higher than female elasticities within a rm, which suggests
that the magnitude of between-rm di¤erences are more than twice the magnitude of within-rm di¤erences
(in our preferred model). In other words, between-rm di¤erences in elasticities are more important than
within-rm di¤erences in elasticities. This result is relevant because regulations targeted at rms might
be able to help address the gender gap. However, it appears that the gender wage gap is driven more by
structural factors that generate gender sorting to rms (e.g., education). This result is in line with Card et
al. (2016) and Cruz and Rau (2017). These authors, analyzing Portuguese and Chilean data, respectively,
used di¤erent approaches and found that most of the wage gap was explained by sorting and that bargaining
power within rms played a comparatively smaller role. Our results call for public policies that focus on
early determinants of the gender sorting by rms. Moreover, we think that our results should be taken into
account when designing policies to decrease the gender wage gap, especially in developing countries.
Finally, we compared Chilean labor supply elasticities with United States adjusted labor supply elasticities
(e.g., adjusting Webbers results by 18%). The results suggest a much less competitive labor market for the
middle-income country (Chile) than for the high-income country (United States). This type of analysis
should be replicated in other middle-income and lower-income countries in order to gain a more in-depth
understanding of the gender wage gap in labor markets with di¤erent characteristics.
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Appendix
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Male Female
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Unit of Observation: Employment Spell (1) (2) (3) (4)
Age (Years) 35.2 11.6 34.6 10.5
High School 0.29 0.46 0.23 0.44
High School Diploma 0.57 0.49 0.61 0.49
Some College 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.22
College Degree+ 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.29
Spell Duration 17.7 24.4 20.4 26.5
Log(wages) 2.97 0.60 2.67 0.56
Wages (UF) 23.6 16.2 17.4 13.5
Observations 4,467,641 2,398,995
Note: Summary statistics by gender of our nal sample from the "Seguro de Cesantía" administrative records complemented
with the administrative records from the Ministry of Education.
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Table 2
Estimated Firm-level Labor Supply Elasticities and their Distribution
Model Mean 25th 50th 75th
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male Elasticities
Earnings only 0.96 0.42 0.80 1.42
No education controls 0.52 0.13 0.43 0.91
Full model 0.48 0.07 0.39 0.85
Full model time varying 0.49 0.00 0.39 0.92
Female Elasticities
Earnings only 0.97 0.32 0.97 1.55
No education controls 0.41 0.00 0.37 0.98
Full model 0.38 0.00 0.34 0.97
Full model time varying 0.38 0.00 0.37 1.09
Three separate regressions, corresponding to equations (15)(17), were estimated separately by gender for each rm in the
data that met the conditions described in the Data section. The coe¢cients on log earnings in each regression were combined,
weighted by the share of recruits and separations to employment to obtain the estimate of the labor supply elasticity to the
rm. The rst row of each panel represents estimates from equations where the only regressor in each model is log earnings.
Second row also includes: age; age-squared; tenure, tenure squared, region, type of contract, number of employees working
at the rm and industry indicator variables. Third row includes all previous controls plus indicator variables for education
level. Year e¤ects are included in all models. The rst three rows report only the long-run elasticities, while the fourth row
describes the elasticities when a steady-state is not assumed, and they are allowed to vary over time (i.e. the short
run elasticity of Manning (2003)).The rst column reports the rm labor-supply elasticity calculated with separations (i.e.
voluntary and involuntary separations) while the fth reports the same but using voluntary separations only (i.e. quits).
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Table 3
Comparing Developed versus Developing Labor Supply Elasticities
Model Chile U.S.
(1) (2)
Male Elasticities
Full model time varying 0.49 0.80
Female Elasticities
Full model time varying 0.38 0.77
Three separate regressions, corresponding to equations (15)(17), were estimated separately by gender for each rm in the
data that met the conditions described in the Data section. The coe¢cients on log earnings in each regression were combined,
weighted by the share of recruits and separations to employment to obtain the estimate of the labor supply elasticity to the
rm. We present the full model time varying results only. Results for other specications are available upon request. The
full model time varying describes the elasticity when a steady-state is not assumed, and they are allowed to vary over
time (i.e. the short run elasticity of Manning (2003)). Both columns report the rm labor-supply elasticity calculated
using voluntary separations only (i.e. quits). U.S. elasticities are adjusted by 18% as suggested by Sánchez et al. (2019). Both
columns represent the elasticity at the mean of the distribution for the full model time varying. Control variables include: log
earnings; age; age-squared; tenure, tenure squared, region, type of contract, number of employees working at the rm and
industry indicator variables; indicator variables for education level and year e¤ects.
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Table 4
Di¤erences in labor Supply Elasticities (Between and within rms)
Mean
Di¤erences Between Firms
Earnings only -0.07
No education controls 0.09
Full model 0.06
Full model time varying 0.07
Di¤erences Within Firms
Earnings only -0.04
No education controls 0.01
Full model 0.03
Full model time varying 0.03
Note: Between rms di¤erences among men and woman are obtained using rms that only includes individuals who work
at rms where we were able to estimate both a male and female labor-supply elasticity. We take the average male elasticity
between rms and substract the average female elasticity between rms. Within rms di¤erences are obtained by taking the
di¤erence between male and female elasticities for each rm and then taking the average of the di¤erences across rms. The
sample includes workers who work at rms where we can identify both a male and female elasticity. This sample has 3,387,908
employment spells, belonging to 1,742,547 unique individuals, who work at 2,374 separate rms.
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Table 5
Characterization of Firms by Elasticity Percentile
Full Model Time Varying
Model 25th 75th
(1) (2)
Male Elasticities
Age 34.32 34.22
<High School 0.28 0.26
High school diploma 0.58 0.59
Some college 0.06 0.06
College degree + 0.08 0.09
spell 14.07 18.87
Log(wage) 2.88 3.02
Female Elasticities
Age 34.83 34.34
<High School 0.26 0.20
High school diploma 0.60 0.61
Some college 0.05 0.07
College degree + 0.10 0.12
spell 16.26 19.29
Log(wage) 2.56 2.84
Three separate regressions, corresponding to equations (15)(17), were estimated separately by gender for each rm in the
data that met the conditions described in the Data section. The coe¢cients on log earnings in each regression were combined,
weighted by the share of recruits and separations to employment to obtain the estimate of the labor supply elasticity to the
rm. We present the full model time varying results only. Results for other specications are available upon request. Control
variables include: log earnings; age; age-squared; tenure, tenure squared, region, type of contract, number of employees working
at the rm and industry indicator variables; indicator variables for education level and year e¤ects. The full model time varying
describes the elasticity when a steady-state is not assumed, and they are allowed to vary over time (i.e. the short
run elasticity of Manning (2003)). Both columns report the 25th and the 75th percentile of the labor-supply elasticity
distribution calculated using voluntary separations only (i.e. quits).
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